The objective of this document is to establish a terminology framework and to provide the operational requirements, which can be used by different Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) authorities who are considering establishing trust relationships with each other. The document defines different types of possible trust relationships, identifies design and implementation considerations that PKIs should implement to facilitate trust relationships across PKIs, and identifies issues that should be considered when implementing trust relationships. This document defines terminology and interoperability requirements for multi-domain PKIs from one perspective. A PKI domain can achieve multi-domain PKI interoperability by complying with the requirements in this document. However, there are other ways to define and realize multi-domain PKI interoperability.
Document Outline
Section 2 introduces the PKI basics, which provide a background for multi-domain PKI. Section 3 provides the definitions and requirements of 'PKI domain' and describes the typical models of multi-domain PKI. Section 4 considers the Trust List Models depending on relying party-CA relationships (not CA-CA trust relationships, as they are not a focus of this document). Section 5 identifies abbreviations used in the document.
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) Basics

Basic Terms
The following terms are used throughout this document. Where possible, definitions found in RFC 4949 [RFC4949] have been used.
Certificate: A digitally signed data structure that attests to the binding of a system entity's identity to a public key value (based on the definition of public key certificate in RFC 4949 [RFC4949] ).
Certificate Policy: A named set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class of application with common security requirements (X.509 [CCITT.X509.2000]). Note that to avoid confusion, this document uses the terminology "Certificate Policy Document" to refer to the document that defines the rules and "Policy Object Identifier (OID)" to specify a particular rule set. In a hierarchical relationship, as shown in Figure 1 , one CA assumes a parent relationship to the other CA.
There are two types of hierarchical relationships, depending on whether a subordinate CA certificate or a unilateral crosscertificate is used. In the case where one (superior) CA issues a subordinate CA certificate to another, the CA at the top of the hierarchy, which must itself have a self-signed certificate, is called a root CA. In the case where one CA issues unilateral crosscertificates to other CAs, the CA issuing unilateral crosscertificates is called a Unifying CA. Unifying CAs use only unilateral cross-certificates.
NOTE: In this document, the definition of root CA is according to the second definition (context for hierarchical PKI) of 'root CA' in RFC 4949 [RFC4949] . This document uses the terminology 'trust anchor CA' for the first definition (context for PKI) of 'root CA' in RFC 4949.
Root CA: A CA that is at the top of a hierarchy, and itself should not issue certificates to end entities (except those required for its own operation) but issues subordinate CA certificates to one or more CAs.
Subordinate CA: A CA whose public key certificate is issued by another superior CA, and itself must not be used as a trust anchor CA.
Unifying CA: A CA that is at the top of a hierarchy, and itself should not issue certificates to end entities (except those required for its own operation) but establishes unilateral crosscertification with other CAs. A Unifying CA must permit CAs to which it issues cross-certificates to have self-signed certificates.
Peer-to-Peer CA Relationships
In a peer relationship, no parent-child relationship is created. To establish peer relationships, only cross-certificates are used. Peer relationships can be either unilateral or bilateral, as shown in Figure 2 . Bridge CA: A CA that, itself, does not issue certificates to end entities (except those required for its own operation) but establishes unilateral or bilateral cross-certification with other CAs. Public Key Infrastructure (PKI): A system of CAs that perform some set of certificate management, archive management, key management, and token management functions for a community of users in an application of asymmetric cryptography and share trust relationships, operate under the same Certificate Policy Document specifying a shared set of Policy OID(s), and are either operated by a single organization or under the direction of a single organization.
In addition, a PKI that intends to enter into trust relationships with other PKIs must designate a Principal CA (PCA) that will manage all trust relationships. This Principal CA should also be the trust anchor CA for relying parties of that PKI.
Principal CA (PCA): A CA that should have a self-signed certificate is designated as the CA that will issue cross-certificates to Principal CAs in other PKIs, and may be the subject of crosscertificates issued by Principal CAs in other PKIs.
In discussing different possible architectures for PKI, the concept of a certification path is necessary. A certification path is built based on trust relationships between CAs.
Certification Path: An ordered sequence of certificates where the subject of each certificate in the path is the issuer of the next certificate in the path. A certification path begins with a trust anchor certificate and ends with an end entity certificate.
Single CA Architecture
Definition: A simple PKI consists of a single CA with a self-signed certificate that issues certificates to End Entities (EEs), as shown in Figure 4 . RFC 5217
Multi-Domain PKI Interoperability July 2008
Trust anchor CA: The trust anchor CA must be the CA that has a selfsigned certificate.
Principal CA: Since this PKI architecture has one CA, the Principal CA must be that CA. Figure 5 .
Trust anchor CA: The trust anchor CA must be the root CA.
Principal CA: The Principal CA must be the root CA. Figure 6 . A mesh PKI may also be a partial mesh, where all CAs do not issue cross-certificates to all other CAs. In a partial mesh PKI, certification paths may not exist from all CAs to all other CAs, as shown in Figure 7 . Trust anchor CA: The trust anchor CA for an end entity is usually the CA that issued the end entity's certificate. The trust anchor CA for an end entity that is not issued a certificate from the mesh PKI may be any CA in the PKI. In a partial mesh, selection of the trust anchor may result in no certification path from the trust anchor to one or more CAs in the mesh. For example, in Figure 7 above, the selection of CA1 or CA2 as the trust anchor CA will result in paths from all end entities in the figure. However, the selection of CA3 as the trust anchor CA will result in certification paths only for those EEs whose certificates were issued by CA3. No certification path exists to CA1 or CA2.
Principal CA: The Principal CA may be any CA within the mesh PKI. However, the mesh PKI must have only one Principal CA, and a certification path should exist from the Principal CA to all other CAs within the mesh PKI.
Considerations: This model should be used sparingly, especially the partial mesh model, because of the complexity of determining trust anchors and building certification paths. A full mesh PKI may be useful for certification path building because paths of length one exist from all CAs to all other CAs in the mesh.
Hybrid PKI Architectures
Definition: A hybrid PKI is a PKI that uses a combination of the pure hierarchical model using subordinate CA certificates and the pure mesh model using cross-certificates. with self-issued certificates in the hybrid PKI. However, because of the potential complexity of a hybrid PKI, the PKI should provide guidance regarding the selection of the trust anchor to relying parties because a relying party may fail to build an appropriate certification path to a subscriber if they choose an inappropriate trust anchor.
Principal CA: The Principal CA may be any CA within the hybrid PKI and should have a self-signed certificate for cross-certification with other PKI domains. However, the hybrid PKI must have only one Principal CA and a certification path must exist from the Principal CA to every CA within the PKI.
Considerations: This model should be used sparingly because of the complexity of determining trust anchors and building certification paths. However, hybrid PKIs may occur as a result of the evolution of a PKI over time, such as CAs within an organization joining together to become a single PKI. 
Requirements for Establishing and Participating in PKI Domains
The establishment of trust relationships has a direct impact on the trust model of relying parties. As a result, consideration must be taken in the creation and maintenance of PKI domains to prevent creating inadvertent trust relationships. Figure 9 illustrates this concept. As shown in Figure 9 , PKI2 is a member of both PKI domain 1 and PKI domain 2. Since a certification path exists from PKI1 to PKI2, and from PKI2 to PKI3, a certification path also exists from PKI1 to PKI3. However, PKI1 does not share domain membership with PKI3, so the certification path validation from PKI1 to PKI3 with a validation policy for PKI domain 1 must not succeed. To ensure correct certification path validation and policy mapping, the crosscertificates issued by both PKI1 and PKI3 to PKI2 must contain constraints such as policy mapping or name constraints disallowing the validation of certification paths outside their respective domains.
To fully prevent inadvertent trust, any PKI that is a member of one or more PKI domains must inform all those PKI domains of its membership in all other PKI domains. In addition, that PKI must inform all those PKI domains of which it is a member, any time its membership status changes with regards to any other PKI domain. If a PKI domain is informed of the change in status of one of its member PKIs with regards to other PKI domains, that PKI domain must review the constraints in any cross-certificate issued to that PKI. If the change in membership would result in a change to the allowed or disallowed certification paths, the PKI domain must ensure that all such cross-certificates are revoked and re-issued with correct constraints.
Considerations for PKIs and PKI Domains with Multiple Policies
In some cases, a single PKI may issue certificates at more than one assurance level. If so, the Certificate Policy Document must define separate Policy OIDs for each assurance level, and must define the differences between certificates of different assurance levels.
A PKI domain may also support more than one assurance level. If so, the PKI domain must also define separate Policy OIDs for each assurance level, and must define the differences in requirements for each level.
When PKIs and PKI domains choose to establish trust relationships, these trust relationships may exist for only one defined assurance level, may have a one-to-one relationship between PKI assurance levels and PKI domain assurance levels, or may have many-to-one or one-to-many relationships between assurance levels. These relationships must be defined in cross-certificates issued between PKIs in the PKI domain.
PKI Domain Models
Two or more PKI domains may choose to enter into trust relationships with each other. In that case, they may form a larger PKI domain by establishing a new Unifying or Bridge CA or by issuing crosscertificates between their Principal CAs.
Unifying Trust Point (Unifying Domain) Model
In the Unifying Trust Point Model, a PKI domain is created by establishing a joint, superior CA that issues unilateral crosscertificates to each PKI domain, as shown in Figure 10 . Such a joint, superior CA is defined as a Unifying CA, and the Principal CAs in each PKI domain have the hierarchical CA relationship with that Unifying CA. In this model, any relying party from any of the PKI domains must specify the Unifying CA as its trust anchor CA in order to validate a subscriber in the other PKI domains. If the relying party does not desire to validate subscribers in other PKI domains, the relying party may continue to use the Principal CA from the old PKI domain as its trust anchor CA. This model may be used for merging multiple PKI domains into a single PKI domain with less change to existing PKI domains, or may be used to combine multiple PKI domains into one PKI domain for relying |
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PKI Domain Models
For all PKI domain models described in Section 3.3 created through the issuance of cross-certificates, standard threats including message insertion, modification, and man-in-the-middle are not applicable because all information created by CAs, including policy mapping and constraints, is digitally signed by the CA generating the cross-certificate.
Verifying that a given certificate was issued by a member of a PKI domain may be a time-critical determination. If cross-certificates and revocation status information cannot be obtained in a timely manner, a denial of service may be experienced by the end entity. In situations where such verification is critical, caching of crosscertificates and revocation status information may be warranted.
An additional security consideration for PKI domains is creating inadvertent trust relationships, which can occur if a single PKI is a member of multiple PKI domains. See Section 3.2.3 for a discussion of creating inadvertent trust relationships and mechanisms to prevent it.
Finally, members of PKI domains must participate in domain governance, or at a minimum, be informed anytime a PKI joins or leaves the domain, so that domain members can make appropriate decisions for maintaining their own membership in the domain or choosing to restrict or deny trust in the new member PKI.
Trust List Models
In these models, many standard attacks are not applicable since certificates are digitally signed. Additional security considerations apply when trust is created through a Trust List.
A variation of the modification attack is possible in Trust List Models. If an attacker is able to add or remove CAs from the relying party or Trust Authority Trust List, the attacker can affect which certificates will or will not be accepted. To prevent this attack, access to Trust Lists must be adequately protected against unauthorized modification. This protection is especially important for trust anchors that are used by multiple applications, as it is a key vulnerability of this model. This attack may result in unauthorized usage if a CA is added to a Trust List, or denial of service if a CA is removed from a Trust List.
For Trust Authority models, a denial-of-service attack is also possible if the application cannot obtain timely information from the trust anchor. Applications should specify service-level agreements with Trust Authority. In addition, applications may choose to locally cache the list of CAs maintained by the Trust Authority as a backup in the event that the trust anchor's repository (e.g., Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) directory) is not available.
